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Monkey See, Monkey Do?
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS POSSIBLY
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S
INCORPORATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the issue’s dormancy for nearly a century, the question
of whether the Second Amendment1 confers an individual right, separate
from any connection with the militia, recently reached near hysterical
fervor.2 The militia-based position states that the Second Amendment
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with
militia service.”3 On the other hand, the individual right proposition
“argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”4 Federal courts
were split in their analysis of the issue,5 and in 2008 the Second
1

The language of the Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2
See, e.g., David A. Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring
Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1081 (2005) (“Recent developments . . . have catapulted the
individual right approach to the forefront of the Second Amendment debate.”); Jack N. Rakove, The
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 104 (2000)
(describing the issue as one with a “charged atmosphere”); Koren Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The
Second Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 177, 178 (1998) (“Indeed, the Second Amendment is the source of much modern-day
controversy in both political and academic circles.”); David Yassky, The Second Amendment:
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 589 (2000) (“A fierce debate
about the Second Amendment has been percolating in academia for two decades, and has now
bubbled through to the courts.”).
3
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008).
4
Id.
5
Previously, only two federal Circuit Courts held that the Second Amendment confers
an individual right to bear arms. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2007), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (becoming the first federal appellate court to strike down a gun
control law); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Second Amendment does not confer a collective state right tied to the militia).
The more numerous federal Circuit Court cases, which expressly rejected the view that
the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and use arms for solely private purposes, include:
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d
693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997), opinion
vacated in part by 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d
Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United
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Amendment debate culminated in the landmark case of District of
Columbia v. Heller.6 The Heller Court confirmed that the Second
Amendment enshrines an individual right to possess and use arms for
non-militia purposes and declared portions of the District of Columbia
gun control law unconstitutional.7
As a result of this escalating debate and significant Supreme
Court decision, a second question naturally emerges from the fray: Does
the Second Amendment also serve as a limitation on state action over an
individual’s right to bear arms through incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment?8 If the Second Amendment were applicable to the states,
any state or local gun control law would be subject to review under the
federal Constitution. Many scholars allege that if the Second Amendment
confers an individual right there would be little to prevent incorporation
if the Supreme Court then declares that the right is fundamental.9 Despite
the Court’s pronouncement that it bestows an individual right, however,
because the history and Framers’ intent concerning the Second
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-23
(1st Cir. 1942).
6
After lower federal courts ripened the question for Supreme Court review, on
November 20, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parker v. District of Columbia to
decide whether the District of Columbia’s gun control laws violate the Second Amendment. 478
F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007), and aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
The Court limited the question presented to “[w]hether . . . [three of the District of Columbia’s gun
control provisions] violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with
any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their
homes.” Supreme Court Docket No. 07-290, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-290.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The Court’s decision only concerned restrictions on federal gun laws and
not limitations on state firearm regulations. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23 (noting the question
of incorporation was not presented by the case); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide on
Right to Keep Handgun, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/us/21scotus.html?pagewanted=print (“The justices evidently
decided that this case was not the proper vehicle for exploring [the incorporation] issue, because as a
nonstate, the District of Columbia is not in a position to argue it one way or another.”). Therefore,
regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision, the question of incorporation remains undetermined, and
the Amendment’s history must be reconciled to analyze the incorporation issue.
7
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 2821-22. Specifically, the majority held the ban on handgun
possession in the home and prohibition against operable firearms in the home violated the Second
Amendment. Id. at 2821-22.
8
Incorporation is defined as “[t]he process of applying the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the states by interpreting the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause as encompassing
those provisions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). The Supreme Court
adheres to the selective incorporation theory as set forth in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969). This standard states that “specific pledges of particular amendments have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
become valid as against the states.” Id. at 324-25 (footnote omitted). Cardozo also suggested that
rights protected from state interference are those that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, only carefully reviewed and
tested portions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the states. Since Palko the Supreme
Court has similarly considered whether the right is “fundamental to the American scheme of
justice.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
9
See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1083 (“The nature of the right conferred by the Second
Amendment is inextricably intertwined with the issue of its incorporation against the states.”).
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Amendment suggest that it was ratified, at least in part, as a means to
protect the states from federal encroachment,10 to limit the states would
be contrary to the Amendment’s original purpose. Thus, regardless of the
right’s force as applied to federal law, those determining whether the
Second Amendment should be incorporated must consider and reconcile
the right’s federalist history. Similarly, much like the history of the
Second Amendment, the Framers enacted the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause11 to protect the states from federal imposition of
religion.12 Nevertheless, despite the federalism concerns at the heart of
the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court incorporated this First
Amendment clause to apply as a restriction on state action.13
This Note argues that a historical comparison of the ratification
of the Establishment Clause and the Second Amendment, and the
Supreme Court’s later incorporation of the former right, could foretell
grounds for the Second Amendment’s eventual incorporation. Part II of
this Note analyzes the federalist history surrounding ratification of the
Second Amendment and the proposition that it was largely intended to
protect the states from federal tyranny. Further, Part II discusses the
various case law and scholarly articles, which suggest that due to the
Second Amendment’s fundamental federalist purposes, it has not been
incorporated to limit state action. Part III of this Note details the similar
federalist history surrounding ratification of the Establishment Clause, as
well as its surprising incorporation as a check on state action despite
these federalist underpinnings. Finally, in Part IV this Note investigates
whether the Establishment Clause’s incorporation sheds light on the
possibility of the Second Amendment’s incorporation.14 It argues that the
Second Amendment, despite its intended role at ratification, may limit
10

See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate purpose
of the Amendment was to protect the States’ share of the divided sovereignty created by the
Constitution.”); Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 230 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[I]t is apparent that
the phrase ‘a well regulated militia’ . . . refers to the maintenance of an effective state fighting force,
which was specifically included by the drafters of the Bill of Rights to protect the states against a
potentially oppressive federal government.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Seegars v. Gonzales,
396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also infra Part II.A (detailing the Second Amendment’s
ratification). Indeed, Justice Scalia admits in the Heller majority opinion that “the threat that the new
Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason
that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801. Justice Scalia
emphasizes that the Second Amendment was codified to protect militias. Id. Yet to support his
individual right formulation, he argues that the right to self defense was a “central component” of
this right, even if it was not an overriding codification concern. Id.
11
The text of the Establishment Clause reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1157-59 (1991).
13
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
14
Indeed, one scholar has noted that such a study might be worthy of such attention.
Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 653 n.80
(1989). Discussing incorporation of the Second Amendment, Professor Levinson states, “[o]ne may
wonder whether the interpretive history of the establishment clause might have any lessons for the
interpretation of the Second Amendment.” Id.
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state action given the Court’s incorporation of the Establishment Clause.
Despite the Supreme Court’s adherence to selective incorporation and
the principle that a Bill of Rights Amendment may only be incorporated
if it involves a fundamental right, the Court was willing to overlook this
standard during incorporation of the Establishment Clause.15 Thus, this
Note demonstrates that because the Court was willing to rephrase the
history and purpose behind the Establishment Clause, it is entirely
plausible that the same methodology can be used to incorporate the
Second Amendment, regardless of its original purpose.
II.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT: ITS FOUNDATIONS AND THE
ENSUING FAILURE TO INCORPORATE

The history surrounding the Second Amendment’s emergence
and its ultimate ratification reflects the prevailing struggle inherent in the
creation of this nation’s government.16 Following the Revolutionary War
and the failed Articles of Confederation, two political groups emerged
with opposing viewpoints. The Federalists, led by Framers such as James
Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton sought a strong centralized
federal government.17 Contrastingly, the Anti-Federalists argued that
authority be left in the hands of the individual states.18 This fundamental
divergence spurred the Second Amendment debate, and its ultimate
adoption reflected a compromise between the two ideologies concerning
state and federal powers.19 Thus, arguably because the founding fathers
enacted the Second Amendment as an essential means to preserve state
sovereignty, the Supreme Court has not incorporated the right through
the Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a limitation on state action.20
A.

The History Behind the Second Amendment’s Ratification

To determine the Second Amendment’s role as a limitation on
states’ rights, the history of its creation and ratification should be
analyzed. This history suggests that the Framers intended the Second
Amendment to act as a stalwart against federal tyranny over the
15

See infra Part III.B.
Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107 (“The singular thrust during the debate over the
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives
was the relationship between state and federal power.” (footnote omitted)).
17
See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 47 (2006).
18
See Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in
Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 196 (2000); see also Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1140 (contending that the Anti-Federalists believed that “because of
the attenuated chain of representation, Congress would be far less trustworthy than state
legislatures.”).
19
See infra Part II.A.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
16
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individual states.21 The Framers’ fear of an overly powerful and
oppressive government was rooted in the impetus for the nation’s
founding—specifically, the break from repressive English monarchal
rule during the Revolutionary War.22 The founders articulated this
concern in the Declaration of Independence, which stated that England
“has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislatures,”23 and that it “has affected to render the
Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.”24 Additionally,
driven by the events of Shays’s Rebellion, slave revolts, and attacks by
Indians and foreign nations, during the early stages of this nation’s
creation, the founding fathers also feared possible anarchy.25 It was
against this backdrop that the Framers sought to set forth a government
that could not only protect its citizens from external and internal harm
and influence, but also keep the states safe from domination by the
centralized government.26 Thus, the stage was set for a showdown
between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists to create a governing
body of law for the new nation after the weak Articles of Confederation
proved a failure.27
The main point of contention between the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists in drafting the Constitution at the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention was whether individual state militias or a
nationalistic standing army should protect the country.28 In reaction to the
Federalists’ proposition of a national army, the Anti-Federalists feared an
overly powerful federal government.29 Specifically, the Anti-Federalists
distrusted a national government with the ability to wield a standing
army and undermine the States’ ability to keep it in check.30 Therefore
the contention can be summarized as follows: “[T]he arguments over the
meaning of the right to bear arms and the militia became embroiled in
the larger dispute over federalism. Control of the militia became a crucial

21
See, e.g., Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 229-30 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord Lieber, supra
note 2, at 1098 (“The addendum of a Bill of Rights reflected a profound and enduring belief among
Anti-Federalists that the Constitution itself failed to provide sufficient checks on federal power.”).
22
See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 195.
23
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776).
24
Id. at para. 14.
25
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 39. The events of Shays’s Rebellion culminated with a
violent uprising by a group of Western Massachusetts farmers in armed protest against the state’s
imposition of high taxes. Id. at 31. The founders were also uneasy about the multitudes of enslaved
Africans in the South and the possibility of a coordinated upheaval. Id. at 39. Additionally, Spanish,
British, and Indian occupation at the colonial borders drove safety concerns. Id.
26
See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 195-96.
27
See CORNELL, supra note 17, at 39-41.
28
Id. at 40-41.
29
Id. at 40.
30
Id.
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issue in defining the future balance of power between the states and the
new national government.”31
Ultimately, the convention produced a proposed Constitution
that reflected a series of compromises between the various competing
concerns.32 Included in this compromise were some answers to the
question of control over national security.33 In regards to the militia, the
federal government was given the authority “to provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions,”34 and to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” this
force.35 The states retained power over the “Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.”36 Congress, however, was also granted the
power to “declare War,”37 “raise and support Armies,”38 “maintain a
Navy,”39 and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.”40 The states were expressly forbidden from
“keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace.”41 Moreover, the
President was declared the “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy” and “of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States.”42 Accordingly, to the dismay of the
Anti-Federalists, the Constitution granted the federal government a great
deal of power over national protection and expressly reserved only a
small role for the states. In a last minute effort before the Constitution
was sent to the Continental Congress for approval, the less numerous
Anti-Federalists sought a series of declarations of rights.43 The
Federalists ultimately rejected these amendments, and the more
nationalistic Constitution was approved by the Congress and sent to the
states for ratification.44
One incident in particular during the Constitution’s ratification
process demonstrates that the Anti-Federalists were greatly concerned
with protecting the states from the federal government but believed the
most ideal way to achieve this balance was through state control rather
31

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
33
Id. at 43.
34
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
35
Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 16.
36
Id.
37
Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 11.
38
Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 12.
39
Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 13.
40
Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 14.
41
Id. at art. 1 § 10, cl. 3.
42
Id. at art. 2 § 2, cl. 1.
43
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 43.
44
Id. at 43-44. Article VII of the proposed Constitution stated that “[t]he Ratification of
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between
the States so ratifying the Same.” U.S. CONST. art. VII.
32
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than the exclusive empowerment of individuals against the federal
government. In Carlisle, Pennsylvania, authorities jailed a group of
radical Anti-Federalists after their brawl with Federalists over the state’s
adoption of the Constitution.45 Rather than post bail, the jailed AntiFederalists sought escape by efforts from a local militia, which acted
without state approval.46 These radical actions highlighted the divide
between mainstream Anti-Federalists, who sought a strong role for the
state, and a minority group of radical Anti-Federalists, who fought for
the rights of local communities and individuals.47 In fact, their extremism
pushed the more moderate and numerous Anti-Federalists to strongly
reaffirm that the Second Amendment should correspond with statesponsored checks against the federal government.48 Indeed, following the
Carlisle riot, Pennsylvania’s Anti-Federalists drafted a list of proposed
constitutional amendments rather than insisting on a new constitutional
convention.49 Thus, the possibility of an anti-constitutional movement in
Pennsylvania failed to the dismay of the radical Anti-Federalists.
Arguably the Federalists also understood that the right to bear
arms was firmly rooted in a conflict between the states and the federal
government, rather than one solely between individuals and the federal
government.50 Throughout the heated public debate over ratification of
the Constitution, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison
wrote a series of newspaper articles called The Federalist, which
advocated for the implementation of a strong national government.51
Using the pen name Publius,52 the authors accepted that in the unlikely
chance the nation erupted into civil war, the states could call forth their
militias against the federal government for protection.53 As one scholar
suggests, “while Publius conceded that in extreme situations the states
might have recourse to use their militias against the national government
in the defense of liberty, he denied that individuals or localities were ever
justified in a resort to arms.”54 To demonstrate the chaos that would
result from an unfettered individual right to protect the people from
government tyranny, Publius compared what would be organized militia
efforts under state rule with the hectic and disorderly efforts individuals
45

CORNELL, supra note 17, at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
47
Id.
48
See id. at 57-58 (“While elites on both sides of the constitutional struggle were divided
on many issues, leading Anti-Federalists and Federalists were accord on one thing: the conception of
the militia defended by [radical Anti-Federalists] led to Shaysism and anarchy.”).
49
See id. at 56-58.
50
See id. at 49.
51
Id. at 47-48.
52
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey & McClellan
ed., 2001).
53
See id. (“It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the state
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the
public liberty by the national authority.”).
54
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 49.
46
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would generate against the federal government.55 Thus, the alarm
presented by leading Federalists illustrates that the concern regarding the
right to bear arms was tied to the need for state protection against the
centralized government.56 An unchecked individual right to bear arms for
protection against federal tyranny most certainly raised fears in the
Federalists’ minds.57 Thus, when they adopted the Bill of Rights, these
fears likely influenced the Framers’ impression of the Second
Amendment’s role.
After conceding a great deal of militia control to the Federalists
during the drafting of the Constitution,58 the Anti-Federalists continued to
advocate in state ratification conventions against accepting the
Constitution without a separate bill of rights to protect the states from
federal tyranny.59 In July 1788, this fight finally ended when New
Hampshire became the ninth state to adopt the Constitution.60 Despite
this loss, the Anti-Federalists successfully convinced several state
conventions to add amendments to the ratification documents.61 Because
most of the suggested amendments were intended to decentralize the
federal government with structural changes rather than protect individual
rights, the Anti-Federalists’ overriding concern for states’ rights was
apparent.62 Indeed, several of the proposed amendments spurred by the
55
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey & McClellan ed., 2001).
Publius explained:

Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the
penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have
better means of information; they can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing
all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a
regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community.
They can readily communicate with each other in the different states; and unite their
common forces, for the protection of their common liberty.
Id.
56

Akhil Reed Amar also alleges that Federalist Alexander Hamilton understood that
“[e]ven if armed, unorganized citizens would face an uphill struggle when confronting a disciplined
and professional standing army,” and that state governments were the means to organize against
federal tyranny. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1165.
57
As one scholar points out, individual rights proponents fail to account for the fact that
neither the Anti-Federalists nor the Federalists argued the Second Amendment related to anything
but the militia and the powers of the states and federal government. Rakove, supra note 2, at 161.
Rakove states, “As the records from the Constitutional Convention, the ensuing ratification
campaign, and the debates in the First Congress of 1789 all demonstrate, the issue under discussion
was always the militia, and that issue was posed primarily as a matter of defining the respective
powers of two levels of government.” Id.
58
See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
59
Finkelman, supra note 18, at 197.
60
Id. at 198.
61
Id. at 199-200 (listing Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New
York). The Anti-Federalists designed their own amendments in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Id. at
200.
62
See id. at 200. Finkelman notes that the Virginia delegates wrote a series of proposals
that “would have hamstrung the operations of the national government, weakened all three branches
of the government, and rendered the system more cumbersome.” Id. at 201. For example, Virginia
Anti-Federalists sought super-majority support for several Congressional decisions. Id.
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Anti-Federalists were intended to erode the powers granted to the federal
government and strengthen state control at the expense of individual
citizens’ rights.63 During state ratification, the Anti-Federalists were
particularly concerned with numerous constitutional controls granted to
the federal government over state militias and the government’s apparent
ability to prevent the states from arming their militias.64 Anti-Federalist
George Mason stated at the Virginia ratifying convention that
[t]he militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in
other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless—by
disarming them. Under various pretenses, Congress may neglect to provide for
arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for
Congress has an exclusive right to arm them . . . . Should the national
government wish to render the militia useless, they may neglect them, and let
them perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a standing army.65

In this vein, the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms was
caught in the midst of a battle over the structure of the emerging
government and the states’ ability to protect themselves from the federal
government.66
When the requisite number of states had ratified the Constitution,
the First Federal Congress appointed James Madison to sort through the
various amendments proposed by the states.67 Although the AntiFederalists were soundly defeated in the state conventions, “[t]he most
politically savvy Federalists realized that amendments were necessary to
assuage moderate Anti-Federalists and help broaden support for the
Constitution.”68 Accordingly, Madison’s first draft of the right to bear
arms read:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well
armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render
military service in person.69

Although Madison’s draft seemed to focus on the protection of
the nation as a whole, Congress did not ultimately accept this language.70
The House of Representatives eventually reworked this first draft of the
63

See id. at 201-03. For example, among other structural changes, New York AntiFederalists proposed amendments that “limited federal diversity jurisdiction only to cases involving
land grants, prohibited any federal treaty from operating against a state constitution (thus
undermining the Supremacy Clause), and proscribed Congress from granting monopolies.” Id. at
202.
64
See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107.
65
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 193
(Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL].
66
See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 203.
67
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 59.
68
Id.
69
THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 169.
70
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 60.
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Amendment.71 Before submitting it to the Senate, the House moved the
militia clause before the rights of the people and added “composed of the
body of the people” to describe the composition of the militia.72
Presumably unhappy with the clause stating that the militia was to
provide for the common defense and fearful that it would in effect
concede state control to the federal government, Anti-Federalists in the
Senate had the clause deleted.73 The final version of the Second
Amendment ultimately adopted by the states read: “A well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”74
To determine the Framers’ intent regarding the Second
Amendment, acknowledging the proposed amendments the First
Congress refused to adopt is as helpful as analyzing those they ultimately
implemented.75 The Framers’ concern with preserving state sovereignty
is evident both in the proposed amendments the First Congress refused to
adopt as well as in the amendments it eventually adopted. After the
defeat at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, the Pennsylvanian
Anti-Federalists composed a list of amendments called their “Reasons
for Dissent.”76 Several of the proposals dealt with individual rights and
were later copied almost verbatim into the Bill of Rights.77 The AntiFederalists, however, also included right to bear arms provisions that
acknowledged both state and individual protections. For instance, one of
the proposed amendments declared:
[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their
own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing
armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept
up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and
governed by the civil power.78

71

Id.
THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 170.
73
CORNELL, supra note 17, at 61-62. There are no records of the Senate debates over the
language of the Second Amendment. Id. at 61. Cornell notes, however, that a letter written by
Virginian John Randolph sheds light on the Senate proceedings: Randolph contended, “the Senate
[was] for not allowing the militia arms” and stated the Federalists feared armed citizens who could
“stop their full Career to Tyranny & Oppression.” Id. at 62. Thus, Cornell concludes, “[a] wellarmed militia controlled by the states was necessary to provide the states the ultimate check on
potential federal despotism.” Id.
74
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
75
See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 207-08.
76
Id. at 206.
77
Id. at 206-07 (“The essence, and in some places the exact language, of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Free Press and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment are found in these
fourteen proposals, as are the essence and language of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments. Elements of the Tenth Amendment are also found in the proposals.”).
78
THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 182.
72
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The First Congress proved unwilling to adopt the obvious
individualistic right to bear arms provisions that did not advance state
interests.79 This decision lends credence to the argument that the Framers
believed the Second Amendment was principally tied to federalism and
states’ rights rather than solely focused on the individual right to
protection through the right to bear arms.80 Hence, the First Congress
sought to avoid framing the Second Amendment with an emphasis on an
individual’s ability to protect her or himself. Moreover, because the
Framers were willing to fully adopt other individual right suggestions,81
the failure to affirm the right to bear arms proposals is another indication
that the Second Amendment was predominantly linked with federalism
concerns.82
In sum, ratification of the Second Amendment can be viewed as
a way to placate the Anti-Federalist’s fears of a standing army. In
addition, it served as a compromise between those who advocated for a
strong national government and those who championed states’ rights as a
means to protect the states from federal tyranny. Although the AntiFederalists sought a more decentralized federal government, the Second
Amendment was one battle they won on the federalism front. The
Second Amendment emerged during the great conflict over the structure
of the new nation and was intimately tied to the Anti-Federalist’s
platform that the states must be able to protect themselves from a strong
federal government.83 Thus, at the nation’s founding, the Framers viewed
the Second Amendment as an important way to equalize the balance of
power between the states and the federal government.84 Ultimately, the
people were given the right to bear arms, but the states were granted the
right to oversee and control the extent of this right.

79
80

See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 208.
As one Second Amendment scholar aptly states:

[T]hose who framed and ratified the Second Amendment were seeking not to enshrine
some generalized right of Americans to revolt against government, nor to empower
individuals or small groups of disaffected citizens to take up arms against the established
order. Rather, they sought to protect a specific set of institutions—organized, state-based
militia—that they saw as playing a crucial, liberty-protecting role in their new
government structure.
Yassky, supra note 2, at 628.
81
For instance, the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Press and Speech Clauses of the
First Amendment, as well as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. Finkelman,
supra note 18, at 206-07.
82
See id. at 208.
83
Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107 (“The singular thrust during the debate over the
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives
was the relationship between state and federal power.” (footnote omitted)).
84
See Yassky, supra note 2, at 599 (“[T]he Founders reached a complex and ingenious
compromise in which both the federal army and the states’ militia were assigned carefully delineated
roles. The purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect that compromise.”).
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The Second Amendment as a Limitation Solely on the Federal
Government: The Resolution Against Incorporation

The Second Amendment was historically intended as a means to
protect federalism.85 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has never declared
that the Second Amendment limits state action86 and has not determined
whether it should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.87
Indeed, this Note asserts that in light of its history, it would make little
sense to hold that the Second Amendment, even though it confers an
individual right without limitation to militia affiliation,88 can restrict the
states’ actions given that it was created to ensure their protection. The
Second Amendment guaranteed the states the ability to arm their people,
and therefore, if a state wishes to curtail this right, it may constitutionally
do so. As this Note later discusses, the Supreme Court was willing to
overlook the Establishment Clause’s history during incorporation,
however, and therefore could likewise disregard the history of the
Second Amendment in considering its incorporation.89
The Supreme Court’s first opportunity to discuss application of
the Second Amendment to the states was the 1875 case of United States
v. Cruikshank.90 The defendants in Cruikshank were convicted under the
Enforcement Act of 187091 and accused of depriving two African
American males of their right to bear arms.92 The Court stated:
The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has
been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This
is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of
the national government . . . .93

Thus, the Court unambiguously held that the Second Amendment is
merely a restriction on federal action and does not apply equally to the
states.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this Second Amendment
limitation eleven years later in Presser v. Illinois.94 The petitioner,

85

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
87
See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court did not consider
the question of incorporation in its most recent Second Amendment decision. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
88
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
89
See infra Part III.B, Part IV.
90
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
91
The Act made it a crime when “two or more persons shall band or conspire
together . . . with intent to . . . injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him
by the constitution . . . .” Id. at 548.
92
See id. at 544-45.
93
Id. at 553.
94
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
86
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Herman Presser, was indicted for violation of the Illinois Military Code.95
The indictment alleged that Presser paraded in Chicago armed, without a
license, and without belonging to an authorized state or federal militia.96
The petitioner challenged the state’s restriction of his right to bear arms
in violation of the Second Amendment.97 In Presser, the Court relied on
Cruikshank to find that “a conclusive answer to the contention that this
amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the
amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the
National government, and not upon that of the States.”98 In upholding the
state’s Military Code, there was no question that the Court believed that
the Second Amendment is not a restriction on state action.
In 1894, the Court again definitively stated in its final direct
ruling on the incorporation question that the right to bear arms only
curtails federal action.99 In Miller v. Texas, the defendant alleged that a
Texas law “forbidding the carrying of weapons, and authorizing the
arrest without warrant of any person violating such law” violated the
Second Amendment.100 The Court, however, for a third unequivocal time,
held that the Second Amendment does not limit the states’ authority to
regulate and was therefore constitutionally acceptable.101
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has declined three
separate times to reexamine the incorporation of the Second Amendment.
Arguably, the Court displayed its continued belief that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states when it denied certiorari in
Burton v. Sillis,102 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,103 and Silveira v.
Lockyer.104 Proponents of incorporation could argue that the Second
Amendment has not been extended to the states because the Court has
not had the opportunity to deal with the issue since it began to selectively
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.105 It would seem,
95

Id. at 253. The Code stated that:

It shall not be lawful for any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized
volunteer militia of this State, and the troops of the United States, to associate themselves
together as a military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city,
or town, of this State . . . .
Id.
96

Id. at 254.
Id. at 260.
98
Id. at 265.
99
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
100
Id.
101
See id. (“[I]t is well settled that the restrictions of [the Second Amendment] operate
only upon the Federal power, and have no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts.”).
102
248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968) (state gun control statute).
103
695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (village gun control ordinance).
104
312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (state gun control statute).
105
Sanford Levinson notes that the Court’s incorporation cases pre-date the start of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Levinson, supra note 14, at 653. Levinson also acknowledges the
Court’s opportunities to address the issue and argues “[t]he Supreme Court has almost shamelessly
refused to discuss the issue, but that need not stop the rest of us.” Id. at 653-54 (footnote omitted).
97
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however, that if the Court believed the Second Amendment should be a
restriction on state action as well, it would have taken the opportunity in
Sillis, Quilici, or Silveira to address the issue.106 Therefore, the Court’s
inaction reflects an apparent silent reaffirmation that the Second
Amendment is not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, most lower federal and
state courts have also held that the Second Amendment is not
incorporated, and that it was created, at least in part, to protect the states
from the federal government.107 Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court closely
analyzed the continued viability of the Second Amendment as a sole
restriction on the federal government in light of the increased debate
surrounding this amendment.108 In Silveira v. Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit
undertook a historical and textual look at the nature and scope of the
Second Amendment.109 The Lockyer court confirmed that “the Second
Amendment imposes no limitation on California’s ability to enact
legislation regulating or prohibiting the possession or use of firearms.”110
The Circuit Court also found that the First Congress adopted the
amendment as a way to “protect the people from the threat of federal
tyranny by preserving the right of the states to arm their militias”111 and
highlighted the compromise reached to placate Anti-Federalist fears that
the federal government could disarm the people by inaction.112 Therefore,
in accordance with the Ninth Circuit Court’s reasoning in Silveira, a state
may constitutionally regulate arms as it sees fit.

106

See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1105-06. As one writer asserts:

While individual right adherents view the failure to incorporate the Second Amendment
as an abdication of responsibility, the more plausible explanation is that it merely reflects
the Court’s enduring belief that the Second Amendment does not confer an individual
right to keep and bear arms, and thus would not constrain state gun regulations targeting
individual possession and ownership.
Id.
107
See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The Second
Amendment does not apply to the states.”); accord Hickman v. Block 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Because the Second Amendment guarantees the right of the states to maintain armed militia,
the states alone stand in the position to show legal injury when this right is infringed.”); Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (“Whatever rights in this respect the people may
have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the Second Amendment being to prevent the
federal government and the federal government only from infringing that right.”); Sandidge v.
United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. 1987) (“[The Second Amendment] protects a state’s right
to raise and regulate a militia by prohibiting Congress from enacting legislation that will interfere
with that right. [It] says nothing that would prohibit a state . . . from restricting the use or possession
of weapons . . . .”).
108
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1067-87.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1086-87.
112
Id. at 1085.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: ITS HISTORY AND EVENTUAL
INCORPORATION

Much like the history of the Second Amendment’s ratification,113
the Framers’ intent and public opinion supporting the Establishment
Clause suggest that the Framers intended this clause of the First
Amendment to protect the states from federal encroachment.114 Thus, the
same federalist concerns that permeated the Second Amendment debates
were echoed in the ratification of the Establishment Clause.115 Just as the
Second Amendment provided the states with a means of protection
against federal tyranny,116 the Establishment Clause prevented the federal
government from interfering with state religious establishments.117
Despite the fact that the Framers and states ratified the Establishment
Clause solely to restrict federal activity, however, the Supreme Court
incorporated this part of the First Amendment to limit state action as
well.118 During incorporation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court relied upon the Framers’ intent at ratification but limited its
analysis to the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.119 Many
scholars, however, have criticized the Court’s reliance as misplaced and
misguided.120 Instead, scholars note that the proper focus is better

113

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A
Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1703 (1992) [hereinafter Rethinking the Incorporation]
(“Specifically, the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent Congress from interfering with the
established state churches and with state efforts to accommodate religion.”); William K. Lietzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1990) (“[T]he establishment clause, both as originally conceived and as
understood during the Reconstruction, was meant to be applied only against the national
government.”); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 66 (1962) (“[The
establishment clause’s] inclusion was intended as an implied grant of power over religion to the
states as it affirmatively denied the federal government power to make any law respecting a state
establishment.”).
115
Ultimately, the First Amendment was created to serve a dual role: first, to protect the
states from implementation of a national religion through the Establishment Clause and second, to
grant individuals the right to the free exercise of religion through the free exercise provision. See
Kruse, supra note 114, at 66.
116
See supra Part II.A.
117
See infra Part III.A.
118
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The establishment of religion
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)).
119
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-16.
120
See Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199-2000 (arguing that there was not one particular
theory adopted); see also Kruse, supra note 114, at 72-73 (stating that Madison’s views on the
separation of church and state were not adopted as the basis of the Establishment Clause). Kruse
argues that although Madison was outspokenly against state support of religion in his home state of
Virginia, all of his religion amendments were either modified or not accepted by the First Congress.
Id. Most tellingly, Madison sought specific amendments to restrict state activity, but these were
explicitly rejected. Id. at 73.
114
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directed on the debates of the First Congress and the language of the
accepted amendment.121
A.

The History Surrounding Ratification of the Establishment
Clause

The Framers’ fear of a centralized federal government with the
ability to assert control over religion and religious practices was rooted
in the religious suffering and persecution the early settlers faced from
European governments.122 Indeed, in large part, settlers seeking to escape
religious persecution were among those who founded this country.123
These highly religious people, however, did not entirely renounce stateestablished religion in the new world.124 This is evidenced by the fact that
“[a]t the beginning of the revolution, eight colonies had established
churches.”125 Moreover, although many colonial charters contained
provisions similar to the Free Exercise Clause, “no state constitution
mandated church/state separation.”126 In fact, state establishment of
religion continued up through the time that the Constitution and Bill of
Rights were adopted.127
After the Anti-Federalists failed to defeat the Constitution’s
ratification, the party sought a Bill of Rights to curtail the federal
government’s power.128 Although many of the ratified amendments
served chiefly to protect individual rights from federal encroachment,129
the Establishment Clause did not.130 The Framers adopted this clause to
121

Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1200.
See Kruse, supra note 114, at 83 (“Perhaps it was knowledge of this history that led
the delegates, religious men, to the theory that the national government which they were establishing
should keep hands off religion.” (footnote omitted)).
123
See, e.g., Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1195-96; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (“A
large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of
laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches.”).
124
Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1196.
125
Id. at 1197; see generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-24 (1986) (detailing the colonial establishments of religion
prior to the Revolution).
126
Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1196-97.
127
Kruse, supra note 114, at 106 (“[T]he Constitutions of Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Maryland, South Carolina, New Jersey, and Connecticut provided for some
regulation of religion by their respective governments. Discriminatory tests were required for office
holders in North Carolina and Delaware.”).
128
See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text; see also Rethinking the Incorporation,
supra note 114, at 1704 (“[T]he entire Bill of Rights was concerned with federalism. Because it was
adopted to assuage the fear of centralized power in a national government, none of its provisions
originally applied to the states . . . . [T]he entire Bill of Rights as originally enacted was coated with
a veneer of federalism.”).
129
For example, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment protects several individual rights, including a
right to indictment by a grand jury, a right against double jeopardy, and a right to refuse testifying as
a witness against oneself. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130
See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1157-59.
122
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ensure the states were protected from any federal action that “tended
either to establish or disestablish a state church.”131 The Establishment
Clause’s strong federalist purpose can be gleaned from the ratification
debates and the text the Framers ultimately adopted.
The call for an explicit restriction on the federal government’s
ability to pass religious legislation began during state ratification of the
Constitution.132 Supporters of the Constitution argued that a bill of rights
was not necessary because the federal government was one of
enumerated powers and was not granted the specific power to infringe
religious freedom.133 This fact, however, did not placate those who
sought to protect the states from federal imposition.134 As a result, during
state ratification the Federalists were forced to assure the requisite
number of states that the Congress would enact a bill of rights following
ratification of the Constitution.135 After New Hampshire became the final
required state to ratify the Constitution,136 James Madison drafted a
proposed set of amendments for the Bill of Rights.137 The original
religion clauses presented to the House of Representatives read:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.
....
No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.138

Thus, because Madison explicitly stated how the individual states should
be restricted in the “equal rights of conscience” clause, it appears that he
intended that the Establishment Clause prohibit only the federal
government.139
131

Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199.
See Kevin D. Evans, Beyond Neutralism: A Suggested Historically Justifiable
Approach to Establishment Clause Analysis, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 41, 44 (1989); see also
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3-4 (1978) (detailing state proposals for religious amendments to be included in the
Bill of Rights).
133
Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, 1705; see also THE COMPLETE BILL,
supra note 65, at 55 (providing an excerpt of Madison’s remarks to the House).
134
Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1705-06.
135
See Evans, supra note 132, at 44.
136
Finkelman, supra note 18, at 198.
137
Evans, supra note 132, at 44-45.
138
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834).
139
See MALBIN, supra note 132, at 4; Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 384 (1954). Snee states that Madison clearly
thought it was necessary to limit the states from infringing religious rights, but he did not believe this
was to be done by preventing states from establishing religion. Id. Rather, Snee argues that Madison
intended that the amendment “encroach upon the reserved power of the states only to the extent
necessary to protect the equal rights of conscience; he would leave it to the individual states to adopt
such measures in the field of religion as they saw fit, provided only that they did not thereby infringe
132
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Madison’s draft proposal was referred to the Committee of the
Whole House, which recommended the “equal right of conscience”
provision and amended the provision limiting congressional action.140
Accordingly, the revised provision read, “no religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscious be infringed.”141 Debate in
the House concerning this alteration focused on how the exact language
should read rather than on whom the Establishment Clause would
limit.142
Anti-Federalist Samuel Livermore suggested the next version of
the religion clauses, which read: “Congress shall make no laws touching
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.”143 Additionally, another
Anti-Federalist delegate Elbridge Gerry, was particularly concerned with
the relationship between federal and state governments and supported
Livermore’s proposal, which removed Madison’s “national” language.144
Gerry believed Livermore’s proposal went further than the Committee’s
in assuring that a state’s right regarding religion would not be
infringed.145 In particular, Gerry believed the word “national” “implied
that the Constitution created one nation, with a national government,
instead of a union of states ruled by a federal government with limited
powers.”146 The definitive “touching” language of Livermore’s proposal
ensured that the federal government was significantly curtailed and that
the states retained full ability to support religion.147 Livermore’s
alteration defeated the Committee’s proposal, which was silent regarding
the nation/state debate.148
The House amended the religious clause a final time before
sending it to the Senate, and this amendment reflected a compromise
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.149 The final proposal stated,
“Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”150 The “nation”
language that concerned the Anti-Federalists was not reinstated, but the
those rights.” Id. Thus, Madison’s “establishment clause” and “equal rights of conscious clause” did
not serve the same purpose.
140
MALBIN, supra note 132, at 4-5. Again, the fact that the Committee also approved of
two separate religious clauses, only one of which was specifically aimed at state limitation,
evidences the fact that the Establishment Clause applied only to the federal government.
141
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834).
142
MALBIN, supra note 132, at 9 (alleging that debate concerned the clause’s language
and all delegates agreed that the provision would limit the national government).
143
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834).
144
MALBIN, supra note 132, at 10.
145
See id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 11. Malbin argues that Anti-Federalists were particularly concerned with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, because “as long as Congress was trying to achieve something it had
the power to accomplish,” it could pass laws affecting state establishments. Id. at 16. Thus,
Livermore’s proposal would have prevented the Congress from such action. Id.
149
Id. at 11.
150
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 795-96 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834).
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strong language preventing Congress from “touching” religion was
removed.151 Subsequently, the religion amendment passed through a
series of revisions within the Senate,152 and ultimately the Senate sent the
House a more limited version.153 The Senate’s revision read, “Congress
shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”154 The House refused to accept
the Senate’s proposal and asked that a conference be gathered to consider
the issue.155 The Committee ultimately adopted the final language of the
First Amendment, which states, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”156
The Establishment Clause’s “respecting” language was meant to
serve a dual function.157 First, it prohibits Congress from passing any law
that establishes a religion.158 Second, it also quelled federalism concerns
present during ratification159 by prohibiting Congress from passing
legislation “with respect to an establishment of religion.”160 Thus, the
Establishment Clause prevents Congress from interfering with state
religious establishments.161 This conclusion is supported by the fact that
Massachusetts did not end its religious establishment until 1833, and
Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and South Carolina still exercised some control over
religion at the time of ratification.162 Accordingly, these states would not
have approved the First Amendment had they believed it would preclude
them from religious control.
Ultimately, the Anti-Federalists sought to avoid empowering
what they believed to be an already overly powerful central government
with vast religious control.163 They feared that without an Amendment to
151

See id.; see also MALBIN, supra note 132, at 11.
MALBIN, supra note 132, at 12-13. The Senate debates over the religion amendment
were kept secret but Malbin suggests that “the succession of amendments offered makes it clear that
both the wording of the establishment clause and the very presence of the free exercise clause were
being debated.” Id. at 13.
153
See id. at 13.
154
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 77 (Gales & Seaton 1820).
155
Evans, supra note 132, at 47. It is likely that the House believed that the Senate’s
proposal was too restrictive and did not sufficiently limit the federal government. See MALBIN, supra
note 132, at 13.
156
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
157
See MALBIN, supra note 132, at 15.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
See id. These federalism concerns have been described as “the overriding issue
throughout the Congress. There should be no surprise, therefore, about its importance [with the
Establishment Clause].” Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).
162
Evans, supra note 132, at 48.
163
Many feared that the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, “which gave power
to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the
laws made under it,” would allow the federal government to make laws which would establish a
national religion. Id. at 46.
152
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explicitly limit the federal government, there would be no way to keep
the centralized government from imposing its religious will.164 Because
several ratifying states maintained established religions, however, it is
clear that the Framers and the states did not believe the Establishment
Clause would extend beyond the federal government.165 This idea is well
summarized by constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar:
The possibility of national control over a powerful intermediate association
self-consciously trying to influence citizens’ world views, shape their behavior,
and cultivate their habits obviously struck fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists.
Yet local control over such intermediate organizations seemed far less
threatening, less distant, less aristocratic, less monopolistic—just as local banks
were far less threatening than a national one, and local militias less dangerous
than a national standard army.166

Thus, the fundamental purpose of the Establishment Clause is best
described as a means to limit federal power over the states and prevent
interference with the states’ authority over religious establishments.
B.

The Surprising Incorporation of the Establishment Clause

Because the Framers adapted the Establishment Clause as a
means to protect the states from the federal government,167 it would make
little sense to incorporate it as a limitation on state action.168 Indeed, a
mere cursory reading confirms that the language unambiguously limits
only congressional action. In 1984, however, the Supreme Court
extended the Establishment Clause to curtail state action in Everson v.
Board of Education.169 In Everson, Justice Black, writing for the
majority, held that the Establishment Clause applies equally as a restraint
on the federal and state governments.170 Black reached this conclusion
after first describing the religious persecution suffered by those who
settled in America and the continuation of such practices in the
colonies.171 Black argued that this climate “aroused the sentiment that
164
See Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199 (“The establishment clause was an explicit
restriction on the federal government’s power to meddle in the religious establishments that then
existed.”).
165
Id. at 1201 (“All the states with established churches ratified the amendment without
any expressed concern.”).
166
Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1996).
167
See supra Part III.A.
168
See Evans, supra note 132, at 67 (arguing that holding that “the establishment clause
applies to the states produce[s] an ironic result: an amendment supported by the states as a means to
protect their sovereignty was applied to the states as a means to limit their power”).
169
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
170
Id. (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”).
171
Id. at 8-11. Specifically Black detailed the persecution that occurred in Europe
amongst Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Id. at 8-9. Moreover, Black described how this intolerance
continued in the new world between Catholics, Quakers, Baptists, and Protestants. Id. at 10-11.
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culminated in adoption of the Bills of Rights’ provisions embracing
religious liberty.”172 Specifically, Black focused on the beliefs of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, two people who played a large role in
the new nation’s development.173 Accordingly, Black concluded that the
Establishment Clause was included in an Amendment that protects an
“individual’s religious freedom.”174 Interestingly (and perhaps tellingly),
Justice Black did not analyze the Establishment Clause under the Palko
incorporation test175 to determine whether the clause confers a
fundamental right.176 Without great explanation, Justice Black held that
because the Supreme Court had already incorporated the Free Exercise
Clause, “there is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.”177 Thus, the
Court found that the Establishment Clause limits state action in the same
manner as Congressional action.
Later Supreme Court cases did not attempt to amend or
challenge the Court’s Everson reasoning. For instance, a year after the
Everson decision, the Court held that a state practice that permitted
religious instruction in public schools was a First Amendment
violation.178 The Court did not address the state’s argument that the
Establishment Clause should not be applicable to the states,179 and
reiterated Everson’s holding that “the First Amendment has erected a
wall between Church and State which must be kept high and
impregnable.” 180 Additionally, in Engle v. Vitale, the Court struck down
172

Id. at 11.
Many scholars have criticized the Court’s focus on Madison and Jefferson’s intent. See
supra note 120 and accompanying text. Because the amendment ultimately ratified was altered
several times before its final form, it is more appropriate to study the intent of the entire First
Congress and the ratifying states. See supra Part.III.A; see also Rethinking the Incorporation, supra
note 114, at 1704-05 (arguing that even though Madison and Jefferson may have supported a
separation of church and state in Virginia, it should not be assumed that they therefore “supported a
federally-imposed requirement of separation of church and state”).
174
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). Justice Black concluded with this oftencited phrase: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” Id. at 18. The Court quoted
this language from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), which borrowed the quote
from Thomas Jefferson. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. Incidentally, in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that Jefferson made this statement fourteen years after the Amendments were
ratified and therefore “he would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of
contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” 472 U.S.
38, 92 (1985).
175
See supra note 8. Thus, the Court did not explicitly determine that the Establishment
Clause conferred a right that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and is “so rooted in the
traditions and conscious of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
176
See Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1702 (“Everson is devoid of any
analysis justifying the incorporation of the Establishment Clause under Palko’s selective
incorporation test.”).
177
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
178
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
179
Id. at 211.
180
Id. at 212.
173
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a New York law mandating daily recitation of prayer in public schools as
a violation of the Establishment Clause.181 The Court, per Justice Black,
agreed with the petitioners that a law requiring prayer in public schools
“breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and
State” and again upheld the Everson reasoning.182
A year later in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,
Justice Brennan attempted to square incorporation of the Establishment
Clause with its federalist underpinnings.183 In Schempp, Justice Brennan
alleged, “[i]t has been suggested, with some support in history, that
absorption of the [Establishment Clause] . . . is conceptually impossible
because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose
any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state
churches.”184 Brennan responded to this concern by holding that despite
what may have been relevant during ratification,
it is clear on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments
was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, and thus the problem of protecting official state churches from federal
encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who framed the
[Fourteenth Amendment].185

Hence, it appears that Justice Brennan would argue that state religious
establishments are extinct, and therefore the underlying reasons for nonincorporation are effectively null.
To refute the allegation that the Establishment Clause does not
protect an individual liberty or freedom, Justice Brennan asserted that,
“[t]he fallacy in this contention . . . is that it underestimates the role of
the Establishment Clause as a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise
Clause, of religious liberty.”186 Unfortunately, this conclusory statement
fails to adequately explain how the Establishment Clause, as
distinguished from the Free Exercise Clause, solely guards an individual
right if it was originally intended to protect the states. Perhaps it could
again be argued that because all states have abolished their religious
establishments, the federalist basis for the Establishment Clause is no
longer necessary or valid. That reasoning, however, fails to take into
consideration that the states might seek to regulate religion through
means other than state establishments.
A recent controversial challenge to the Establishment Clause’s
incorporation came in the 1983 case of Jaffree v. Board of School
181

370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
Id. at 425.
183
374 U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 254-55 (footnote omitted). A possible criticism of Brennan’s reasoning is that it
ignores the fact that although state religious establishments were ended by 1833, many states
continued to exert some control over religion. See Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114,
at 1710.
186
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan J., concurring).
182
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Commissioners.187 In Jaffree, Chief Judge Hand of United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama held that the Establishment
Clause does not limit state action.188 Jaffree presented three holdings
based on his detailed historical review of the Establishment Clause’s
ratification.189 First, the Establishment Clause was only intended as a
restriction on the federal government.190 Second, the Establishment
Clause was an express guarantee to the states that the federal government
would not interfere with state religious establishments.191 Third, the
Establishment Clause was not incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment.192 Without addressing the historical analysis presented by
Judge Hand, the Supreme Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to
overrule the District Court on the basis that the First Amendment chiefly
protects an individual right to religious freedom.193 The Court stated that
when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the fundamental
individual liberty protected by the Establishment Clause was extended as
a restriction on state action.194 Again, noticeably absent from the Court’s
reasoning is a discussion to rebut the contention that the Establishment
Clause was in fact originally rooted in federalism concerns. Rather, the
Court simply assumed that the clause safeguards an individual right.
The Supreme Court has arguably failed to reconcile the true
purpose of the Establishment Clause with incorporation. Without strong
support, the Court held that because of its placement within the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause mainly protects a fundamental
individual right.195 Thus, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
the clause became a viable part of the Bill of Rights for incorporation.
Unfortunately, this reasoning skirts a threshold incorporation question: Is
the right concerned solely with an individual rather than state interest?
Additionally, even if the right does advance some degree of individual
right, how does this square with the federalist history of the
187

554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev’d sub nom, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38

(1985).
188

Id. at 1128-29.
See Jaffree, 554 F. Supp at 1113-19.
190
Id. at 1114 (“The establishment clause was intended to apply only to the federal
government.”).
191
Id. at 1115 (“The first amendment in large part was a guarantee to the states which
insured that the states would be able to continue whatever church-state relationship existed in
1791.”).
192
Id. at 1118-19 (“The historical record clearly establishes that when the fourteenth
amendment was ratified in 1868 that its ratification did not incorporate the first amendment against
the states.”).
193
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (“As is plain from its text, the First
Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom
to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own
conscience.”). The Court also strongly stated, “[o]ur unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
judgment . . . makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court’s remarkable
conclusion . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
194
Id. at 49.
195
See supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
189
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Establishment Clause? Despite these unanswered questions, the Court
has firmly stated that the Establishment Clause, regardless of its history,
is part of an individual right of religious freedom, and thereby acts as a
limitation on the states.196
IV.

DOES INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SHED
LIGHT ON INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT?

Acknowledging that federalism concerns are intricately
connected with ratification of both the Establishment Clause197 and the
Second Amendment,198 and that the former was later incorporated against
the states,199 does this indicate anything about the future of the Second
Amendment as a limitation on state action? Despite the current debate
over the nature and scope of the right to bear arms, the Framers at least
partially intended that the Second Amendment serve as a means to
protect the states from federal tyranny.200 Likewise, the Establishment
Clause was originally expected to limit only federal action in an effort to
protect state control over religion.201 This Note argues that if the Court
was willing to overlook the federalist underpinnings of the Establishment
Clause and incorporate the provision,202 similarly, the Second
Amendment’s chief federalist foundations may not bear weight today.
Indeed, there may be comparable reasons to incorporate the Second
Amendment. Thus, although the Supreme Court’s decision that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right without limitation to
militia service does not inevitably foretell incorporation, its incorporation
may be likely.203
A.

Incorporation of the Second Amendment: The Possibility of
Entirely Avoiding the Incorporation Standard

Typically, before incorporating a Bill of Rights provision, the
Supreme Court will consider whether the provision protects a right that is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and is “so rooted in the
196

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
See supra Part III.A.
198
See supra Part II.A.
199
See supra Part III.B.
200
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (“[T]he threat that the
new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the
reason that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution.”); see also supra Part II.A (detailing the
Second Amendment’s ratification).
201
See supra Part III.A.
202
See supra Part III.B.
203
But see Wong-Ervin, supra note 2, at 180 (arguing that if the Supreme Court holds that
the Second Amendment confers a collective militia based right, “then discussion of whether the right
should be incorporated becomes nonsensical”). Wong-Ervin, however, neglects to account for
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and the Court’s failure to justify incorporation of a right
arguably linked to federalist concerns.
197
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traditions and conscious of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”
under the Palko incorporation test.204 In light of this incorporation
standard, many scholars argue that the Supreme Court should not have
incorporated the Establishment Clause because of its original federalist
purpose.205 Arguably, “[b]ecause the Establishment Clause is animated
by the principle of federalism, its incorporation against the states under
the Palko theory of selective incorporation is logically impossible.”206
Accordingly, if the right were drafted to protect the states from the
federal government, it would make little sense to even consider the right
fit for incorporation or deem it “fundamental” to the individual.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court entirely avoided discussing whether the
Establishment Clause should be considered a “fundamental” right or
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”207 Instead, the Court gave the
impression that merely because the Free Exercise Clause had previously
been incorporated, the Establishment Clause should be as well.208
Thus, this Note suggests that even if it is illogical to apply the
incorporation standard to the Second Amendment due to its federalist
foundation, like the Establishment Clause, it could be incorporated
without application of the Palko test. Perhaps, however, the
Establishment Clause can be distinguished from the Second Amendment,
204

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); see also supra note 8 (discussing
incorporation). For an example of the Court’s application of this test, see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases is a
fundamental right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right).
Since Palko the Court has chiefly relied on the Duncan incorporation formulation,
which determines whether the right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 391 U.S. at
149. This similar test, however, was adopted after Everson and therefore not applied therein. The
Supreme Court could also rely on the Duncan standard if it were to assess incorporation of the
Second Amendment. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 2, at 1124 (“Under the factors enumerated in
Duncan, the Second Amendment is clearly not ripe for incorporation, and it is a particularly unlikely
candidate for incorporation in the future.”).
205
See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1157-58 (“[T]he
nature of the state’s establishment clause right against federal dis-establishment makes it quite
awkward to ‘incorporate’ the clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]o apply
the clause against a state government is precisely to eliminate its right to choose whether to establish
a religion-a right explicitly confirmed by the establishment clause itself!”); see also Rethinking the
Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1709 (“Given the federalist nature of the Establishment Clause,
such translation is impossible. . . . [T]he Establishment Clause prevented the federal government
from interfering with state authority over religion. However, incorporation achieves the opposite
result—the elimination of such authority.”).
Constitutional scholar Amar also argues that the First Amendment’s religious clauses
serve a dual role and the Free Exercise Clause alone protects an individual right. Thus, “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment might best be read as incorporating free exercise, but not establishment,
principles against state governments. Like the Speech, Press, Assembly and Petition Clauses, the
Free Exercise Clause was pragmatically about citizens’ rights, not states’ rights: it thus invites
incorporation.” Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, supra note 166, at 4.
206
Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1708.
207
Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25.
208
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Since it had previously interpreted the
First Amendment broadly and found it protected an individual’s “religious freedom,” the Court
argued “[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the
‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Id.
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and therefore the Court would not repeat its disregard of the
incorporation standard. If the Second Amendment’s fundamental purpose
concerned solely the individual without regard to a state’s interest in
protection from the federal government, the analogy to the Establishment
Clause is unsuitable and the incorporation analysis appears logically
applicable. As discussed, however, the Second Amendment has a similar
history to the Establishment Clause,209 and the Everson Court relied
heavily on the Free Exercise Clause’s incorporation as lending credence
to incorporation of the Establishment Clause.210 Does the Second
Amendment also include this possibility of bootstrapping an individual
purpose with a federalist one? If so, this Note argues that this aspect of
the Court’s reasoning in Everson may be illustrative of the Second
Amendment’s future.
Indeed, while the Second Amendment is generally not
understood as extending two distinct rights,211 some recent interpretations
by individual rights proponents illustrate that there may be dual purposes
to the Amendment.212 Essentially, the argument follows that because the
Framers intended that the Second Amendment protect both the states and
the people from federal encroachment and other outside threats, the most
effective way to do so was by conferring an individual the right to bear
arms.213 For instance, in Parker v. District of Columbia, after a thorough
analysis of the text and history of the Second Amendment, the Circuit
Court concluded that the individual right to bear arms adopted by the
Framers was “premised on the private use of arms for activities such as
hunting and self-defense, the latter being understood as resistance to
either private lawlessness or the depredations of a tyrannical government
(or a threat from abroad).”214 The Court acknowledged that federalist
concerns related to the militia were present during ratification, but held
the “individual right facilitated militia service by ensuring that citizens
would not be barred from keeping the arms they would need when called

209

See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
211
See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1075 (2002) (“[As] evident from the
structure of the Second Amendment, the first clause explains the purpose of the more substantive
clause that follows, or . . . it explains the reason necessitating or warranting the enactment of the
substantive provision.”).
212
See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1162 (“[T]he text of
the Second Amendment is broad enough to protect rights of discrete individuals . . . but the
Amendment’s core concerns are populism and federalism.”). Amar argues, however, that despite
federalism concern inherent to both, the Second Amendment is distinguishable from the
Establishment Clause because certain aspects of the Second Amendment shift the focus away from
the federalism concerns present at ratification. See id. at 1165-68.
213
See Christopher J. Schmidt, An International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 989 (2007). Schmidt argues that the Second Amendment was
enacted to serve two roles, which include “the right of the people to resist government tyranny” and
“the means for the people to ensure the right to individual self-defense.” Id.
214
478 F.3d 370, 395 (2007).
210
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forth for militia duty.”215 Accordingly, the Second Amendment might be
read to furnish an individual the means to keep arms as well as the states’
ability to preserve a militia for self-protection.
Similarly, Justice Scalia presented a “dual” purpose argument in
District of Columbia v. Heller. In his discussion of the relationship
between the prefatory216 and operative clauses of the Second
Amendment,217 Justice Scalia noted that it is “entirely sensible that
the . . . prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia,” but argues that most
Americans cherished the right because of its importance for “self-defense
and hunting.”218 Accordingly, Justice Scalia argued that the Second
Amendment was codified for one reason but valued for another.
Although this Second Amendment dual formulation does not map
exactly onto the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analysis noted
above,219 the same argument is apposite. Because it is sensible to
incorporate the Amendment for one of its purposes, a Court might again
ignore the federalist purpose in its incorporation analysis.
Therefore, it could be broadly argued that the Second
Amendment, like the Establishment Clause, serves a dual function and
was enacted to protect both the state and the individual. Thus, perhaps
the Supreme Court will again overlook the incorporation test and extend
the Second Amendment’s limitations to state action regardless of the
Amendment’s federalist underpinnings. Although the Court has not
incorporated the “individual” clause of the Second Amendment as it had
done with the Free Exercise Clause at the time of the Everson, the same
reasoning may still apply. On the other hand, the Everson Court also
believed it was important that “[t]he meaning and scope of the First
Amendment . . . in light of its history and the evils it was designed
forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions
of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states
by the Fourteenth.”220 Arguably, this same case history does not support
the Second Amendment and may provide a means to distinguish
incorporation of the Establishment Clause.221
Along those same lines, the Second Amendment (or more
correctly, its “individual” clause) may be distinguished from the
Establishment Clause on other grounds. The Establishment Clause is
215
Id. But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (2001) (concluding that the
Second Amendment only confers an individual right and does not confer any rights to the states
relating to the militia).
216
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
217
“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Id.
218
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008).
219
See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.
220
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947).
221
See supra Part II.B.
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included within the First Amendment, arguably one of the most
venerated protections. Perhaps the exalted nature of the First Amendment
propelled the Establishment Clause toward incorporation. Because the
Second Amendment does not hold the same weight and importance as
the protections afforded and values underlying the First Amendment,
incorporation may not be as likely.222 The most significant fact to be
gleaned from incorporation of the Establishment Clause, however, is the
proposition that even if a Bill of Rights provision appears to have a
fundamental federalist purpose, if there is a means to bootstrap the
federalist component with an individualistic provision, incorporation is
possible. Accordingly, this Note suggests that because the Supreme
Court has read the Second Amendment to protect an individual right,223
incorporation may not be unlikely, regardless of the Amendment’s
federalist roots.
B.

Religious Establishments, Militias, and the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment

Many scholars and several members of the Court have argued
that incorporation of a Bill of Rights Amendment should focus on the
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers rather than on those who
created the Bill of Rights.224 Thus, the Court’s inquiry should focus on
whether the right in question was one the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Framers considered “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”225 Concededly, this approach logically applies to portions of the
Bill of Rights that protect purely individual rights, because doing so does
not change the true nature of the right. For instance, the Fifth226 and Sixth
222
In light of Justice Scalia’s strong language in District of Columbia v. Heller, this
argument stands on more dubious grounds. See 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797-99 (2008). Justice Scalia
notes, “it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” Id. at 2797. Justice Scalia traced the history of the right
to the English Bill of Rights, which Protestants demanded as protection from disarmament by the
crown. Id. at 2798.
223
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
224
See, e.g., Yassky, supra note 2, at 629 (arguing “that the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read to abrogate the constitutional commitment to preservation of the states’ militia”). As
discussed above, Justice Brennan argued in his concurring opinion in Schempp that the focus
regarding incorporation of the Establishment Clause should be on circumstances present during
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text. Aside
from this mention by Brennan, which was made in a case that did not utilize the incorporation
standard, the Court has failed to specify which time period is of crucial import in the incorporation
analysis. See Wong-Ervin, supra note 2, at 201.
225
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
226
The Fifth Amendment states:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . . .
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Amendments227 were originally intended to protect the individual from
oppressive federal conduct and only became a limitation on state action
through the Fourteenth Amendment.228 Therefore, incorporation of these
individual rights merely expanded their ensured protections to state
action. This Note contends, however, that neither the structure of the
rights conferred by the Establishment Clause, nor the Second
Amendment, fits appropriately into the Fourteenth Amendment’s
language. This incongruity is due to their federalist roots and their
function as protectorates of the states from federal encroachment. In
actuality, holding that the Establishment Clause and the Second
Amendment limit state action does not merely change the focus or
strength of the amendments, but rather alters their true nature and
structure.229 Hence, each provision morphs from one that prevents the
federal government from trampling state rights to one that precludes the
states from carrying out the powers inherently granted to them under the
Amendment.230
Despite the irrationality of extending the same reasoning for
incorporation of the individualistic provisions like the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to incorporation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court did just so in Everson v. Board of Education.231 Perhaps
recognizing the inherent differences between the Establishment Clause
and other Bill of Rights provisions, Justice Brennan attempted to justify
applying the Establishment Clause against state action in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp.232 Justice Brennan argued that
regardless of the circumstances at ratification of the Second Amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227
The Sixth Amendment reads:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
228
For instance, the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause was incorporated in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), and the Sixth Amendment’s trial by impartial jury clause
was incorporated in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The indictment of a grant jury
provision of the Fifth Amendment is the only provision of that Amendment that has not been
incorporated. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
229
See Kruse, supra note 114, at 126 (“[The Establishment Clause] cases suggest an
answer to the issue whether a power expressly reserved to the states can become atrophied by a later
amendment.”); Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1708 (“The function of the
incorporation doctrine is to locate those fundamental liberties found in the Bill of Rights and extend
their application from the federal government to the states. But incorporation theory does not seek to
change the nature of the right at issue.”).
230
For example, because the Establishment Clause originally protected a state’s right to
control religion, see supra Part III.A, incorporation strips the state of the ability to do so. See, e.g.,
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
231
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
232
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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state religious establishments no longer existed at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.233 Justice Brennan found it
significant that “the problem of protecting official state churches from
federal encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who
framed the post-Civil War Amendments.”234 In effect, Justice Brennan
argued that regardless of the nature of the right conferred by the
Establishment Clause at ratification, the inquiry should focus on whether
the nature of the right had changed by the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification and whether the right continued to serve the
same purpose.
Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Schempp may prove particularly
illustrative for incorporation of the Second Amendment because the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may not have supported state
organized militias,235 and today such organizations have “faded into
insignificance.”236 When the Framers ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
the prevailing view was no longer that the federal government was the
only governmental entity capable of tyranny.237 Second Amendment
scholar David Yassky states that “[t]o the men who framed and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was manifestly the states, not the federal
government, that had perpetrated the most horrible deprivations of liberty
in the nation’s history.”238 Yassky is, of course, referring to the Civil War
and the nation’s violent divide. This uprising was fueled in great part by
the rebellious states’ ability to raise an army against the government.239
For the Second Amendment Framers, however, the states were to prevent
and protect against “federal overreaching.”240 It was simply assumed that
the federal government would be the “wrongful aggressor” and the states
would serve as the “defenders of liberty.”241 Thus, it was with this
dissimilar understanding and distrust of state power that the Framers
passed the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict state rights and thereby
alter the governmental structure. The states were no longer trusted with
unfettered control of the populace for purposes of armed resistance.242
233

Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
235
See Yassky, supra note 2, at 647.
236
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (noting the District of Columbia’s argument that the
Framers’ idea of an organized militia no longer exists).
237
Yassky, supra note 2, at 647.
238
Id.
239
See id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 910 (2001) (“Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s text
did not explicitly rewrite the Founders’ elaborate rules about militias and armies, the simple fact of
the amendment itself invites a new understanding in which local militias are no longer the
unambiguous heroes, and the Union’s army is no longer the presumed villain, of American’s epic
constitutional narrative.”).
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Therefore, this Note suggests that perhaps the focus and prominent
interpretation of the Second Amendment had changed before ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conceivably, like the Establishment
Clause, regardless of its original purpose, the Second Amendment may
have morphed from a right intended to protect a state’s ability to prevent
federal tyranny to one that now concerned solely an individual’s right to
defend against all potential government overreaching.
The idea that the Second Amendment has changed in nature
since the time of ratification is further bolstered because, like
establishments of religion, state militias largely ceased to exist after the
nineteenth century.243 During the Second Amendment’s ratification, “[a]
group of men did not constitute a ‘militia’ until they were organized by
the state to serve the common defense.”244 These state sponsored
organizations, however, are no longer operational.245 Today, the closest
substitute for a state militia is the National Guard,246 but this institution is
“fully equipped” by the federal government and serves national
purposes.247 Indeed, because the National Guard is a federally controlled
association, it arguably does not serve individual state interests.248 Thus,
control of state militias has seemingly passed from state to national
authority, and as a result, the significant change to this tradition perhaps
undermined the original purpose of the Second Amendment.
This Note contends that if the Second Amendment was ratified
as a means to ensure the states were afforded some degree of protection
from the federal government249 and the states have ceded the means to
exercise that right,250 that privilege may no longer be necessary. Like the
Establishment Clause and the end of state religious establishments, it
could be argued that the federalist principles underlying the Second
Amendment have eroded, and there is support for the assertion that the
243
Yassky, supra note 2, at 628. Arguably this occurred with the passing of The Militia
Act of 1903, which organized the various state militias into the current National Guard framework.
See Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775, 775-80 (1903).
For another way to interpret the Militia Clause, see Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, supra note 12, at 1165-66. Amar argues that militia “had a very different meaning 200
years ago than in ordinary conversation today.” Id. Although today many consider the National
Guard as a possible state militia, “200 years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional, part-time
volunteers, like today’s Guard, would have been . . . viewed . . . as little better than a standing army.
In 1789 . . . ’the militia’ referred to all Citizens capable of bearing arms.” Id. at 1166. Thus, today
the word militia invokes thoughts of an organized select body whereas the Framers’ vision of militia
was far more unorganized. This same argument was adopted by the Parker court. Parker v. District
of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (“[T]he ‘well regulated Militia’ was not an elite or select body.” (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. II)). This view can be criticized on the ground that it ignores the clarifying phrase, “well
regulated,” which precedes militia. See Yassky, supra note 2, at 627.
244
Yassky, supra note 2, at 627.
245
Id. at 628.
246
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1166.
247
Parker, 478 F.3d at 379.
248
See Wong-Ervin, supra note 2, at 185.
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See supra Part II.A.
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See supra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
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nature of the right was altered when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. Therefore, this Note suggests that the Schempp reasoning used to
justify incorporation of the Establishment Clause could feasibly extend
to the Second Amendment.
If the Supreme Court decides to incorporate the Second
Amendment, the resulting effect might be great. State and federal courts
would be constitutionally required to strike down state and local gun
control laws that infringe upon the right to bear arms. Of course, if the
Second Amendment is incorporated against the states, judicial review of
state gun control laws will turn on the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny.251 In District of Columbia v. Heller, however, the Supreme
Court failed to establish a level of scrutiny for use in determining the
constitutionality of a federal firearm regulation.252 Justice Scalia merely
held that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied
to enumerated constitutional rights,” the handgun ban and prohibition
against operable firearms in the home are unconstitutional.253 Thus, it is
unclear how federal gun control laws should be examined in the future,
and therefore it is also difficult to predict the appropriate standard of
review for state laws if the Supreme Court incorporates the Second
Amendment.254
In any event, after incorporation, any state or city attempt to curb
gun violence and regulate firearms may be tested under federal law.255 An
example of a regulation at the mercy of judicial review is Chicago’s gun
control law, which bans possession of handguns acquired after 1983 and
requires registration every two years for guns obtained prior to 1983.256
Another illustration is New York City’s regulation that allows handgun
251

See Janice Baker, Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis:
Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms in the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 5459 (2002).
252
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18, 2821 (2008). Justice
Scalia defends his failure to set forth a test and states, “since this case represents this Court’s first indepth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field . . . .” Id. at 2821.
253
Id. at 2817-18.
254
According to the United States government’s current position, the Second Amendment
does not confer an absolute right and is “subject to reasonable restrictions designed to
prevent . . . criminal misuse.” Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 19
n.3, United States v. Emerson, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (No. 01-8780), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2001/0responses/2001-8780.resp.pdf. Consequently, if the Supreme
Court adopts this standard, state gun control laws would likely be subject to the same criterion.
Therefore, incorporation would not result in a total ban on state gun control laws. Likewise, even if
state gun control laws were subject to the strict scrutiny test applied to fundamental rights, see
Baker, supra note 251, at 59, many state laws could survive. Saul Cornell, The Early American
Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearm Regulation, and the
Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 596 (2006). Accordingly, Saul believes “the
academic debate about the meaning of the Second Amendment may turn out to be moot.” Id.
255
For one analysis of the effects of incorporation on gun control regulations, see Baker,
supra note 251, at 54-60 (describing “The Effect of Incorporation and Judicial Standards of Review
on State and Local Gun Control Legislation”).
256
Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide on Right to Keep Handgun, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2007, at A1.
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possession as long as the owner obtains a permit from a Police
Department.257 If the Supreme Court determines that the Second
Amendment should be incorporated, these regulations will be open to
constitutional challenge regardless of the inherent wisdom behind their
passage.
V.

CONCLUSION

In reality, the benefit of comparing the Second Amendment with
the Establishment Clause depends on what path the Court eventually
decides to take. A review of the history behind the Establishment Clause
and Second Amendment’s ratification, however, highlights that the
provisions reflect the very same concerns and questions regarding the
proper role of and relationship between the federal and state
governments.
Ultimately, both the Establishment Clause and the Second
Amendment emerged as part of a larger compromise between those who
sought to leave power with the individual states and those who believed
power should be lodged in a centralized government.258 The Second
Amendment provided a means for the states to arm its people and protect
themselves against the possibility of federal tyranny.259 The
Establishment Clause initially prevented the federal government from
both imposing its religious will and acting to destroy state religious
control.260 The Court was willing to overlook the federalist underpinnings
during incorporation of the Establishment Clause, however, and
surprisingly held that the provision is also a limitation on state action
over the individual.261 This Note should shed at least some light on the
reasons for or against incorporation of these Bill of Rights provisions.
Thus far, the Court has not been disposed to incorporate the
Second Amendment against the states, conceivably because it has
impliedly recognized the Amendment’s underlying purpose.262 Whether
or not the Second Amendment’s federalist history will be set aside
remains a question to be determined, but perhaps in the meantime the
Establishment Clause can tell us a little something about that possibility.
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